Volume 37

Issue 1

Article 13

December 1930

Equity--Showing a Deed Absolute on its Face to be a Mortgage-Effect of Illegality in Transaction
James A. McWhorter
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
James A. McWhorter, Equity--Showing a Deed Absolute on its Face to be a Mortgage--Effect of Illegality in
Transaction, 37 W. Va. L. Rev. (1930).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol37/iss1/13

This Recent Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

McWhorter: Equity--Showing a Deed Absolute on its Face to be a Mortgage--Eff
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
quired land if the additional burden on the servient tenement was

slight.
Suppose the timber on the above-mentioned 31-acre tract ,had
first been piled on the 95-acre tract for the purpose of drying.
In the case of
Could it then be hauled over the right of way?
Williams v. James," hay from land adjoining was stacked on the
dominant land, and later was carted across the servient tenement.
The English court said that the defendant could make an ordinary
and reasonable use of the dominant field, but could not use it as
a pretext to increase the scope of the easement. The jury found that
the defendant was making a bona fide use of his land in stacking
A
hay on it. It followed that his use of the way was proper.
similar situation would arise here if the timber was piled on the
If this
dominant land to dry and then hauled across the way.
were done bona fide, and not as a pretext to secure the use of the
way, it would seem to be a reasonable use of the dominant land.
If so, the defendant could then transport the timber over the way,
although it would indirectly benefit land adjoining the dominant
tenement. The West Virginia Court has held that a way of necessity is granted for any and all purposes for which land is reasonably adapted
It would seem to follow that timber or other
products from. adjoining land might be brought on the dominant
tenement for any reasonable purpose and later hauled therefrom
across the way.
-A.
VILLIAM PETROPLUS.

EQUITY-SHOWING

A

DEED

ABSOLUTE ON

ITS FACE TO BE A

MORTGAGE-EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY IN TRANSATIN.-Miller

ap-

plied to McNabb for a loan of $100,000, who instead of taking
a lien on his property as security had him to convey
the same to 'him in fee, giving Miller a lease on same for five
years with the option to repurchase for the amount of the loan.
After MeNabb died,
This was done to avoid usury and taxation.
Ben Lomond Company, assignee of Miller, sought to repurchase the
property. Trial court decreed that the $100,000 be paid to
Florence McNabb, the widow. The heirs appealed and the Supreme
Court reversed the decree and refused to give effect to the parol
£2 C. P. 577 (1867).
8
Crotty v. New River Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S. E. 233 (1913); Ulil v.
Railroad Co., 47 W. Va. 59, 34 S. E. 934 (1899).
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evidence proving that the deed was in fact a mortgage.
Ben
Laonwnd Co. v. McNabb et al."
It is well settled that a deed absolute on its face may be shown
by parol evidence to be in fact a mortgage
The basis of this
rule is, however, that the party seeking so to do must have an independent equity, and the normal case in which it is done, is one
between the lender and the borrower.
Granting that the above
rule and theory of same is well founded, the question remains,
should it conclude this case?
The unique feature of this situation is that the interested parties
both claim under the party who had the advantage of the socalled improper device, this is, the lender.
But the court fails
to notice its peculiar facts and deals with it just as it would treat
a case involving a controversy between the lender and borrower.
The heirs cannot be said to stand in a better position than the
widow because they are both claiming under the same person.
If McNabb had lived the $100,000 would have been paid to him
and would have been his personal property to do with it as he
wished. To the present plaintiff it makes no difference what the
court decrees the instrument to be because it is ready to pay the
specified amount.
Why should the court by its action discriminate between those
claiming under the lender?
There was no question of unclean
hands inter sese.
The court says that it will not give aid to a
party seeking to enforce an illegal or fraudulent contract, but here
the widow is not trying to enforce one, rather she is trying to
show the true nature of the transaction for a collateral purpose
unopposed to the policy of the rule. It is well settled that equity
will give relief to those who have become the victims of usurious
contracts and will set the same aside and restore the property.'
From this it would seem that the court would be furthering public
policy to give effect to the parol evidence rather than enforce
the contract as that which it appears to be on its face.
Clearly
the purpose of the usury laws was circumvented in this instance.
The effect of the decision is to defeat the collection of taxes on
Ben Lemond Co. v. McNabb, et al., 153 S. B. 905 (W. Va. 1930).
Noto (1906) 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 209; Vangilder v. Hoffman, 22 W. Va.
1 (1883); Harvey v. Shipe, 78 W. Va. 246, 88 S. E. 830 (1916); Hudkins
v. Crim, 72 W. Va. 418, 78 S. E. 1043 (1913).
'Johnson v. Chicot Bank & Trust Co., 128 Ark. 640, 194 S. W. 29 (1917);
Chase & Baker Co. v. Nat'l Trust & Credit Co., 215 Fed. 633 (1914);
Davisson v. Smith, 60 W. Va. 413, 55 S. E. 466 (1906); Blaisdell v. Stein.
feld, 15 Ariz. 155, 137 Pac. 555 (1914).
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the loan. By giving effect to the parol evidence the court could
declare the deed a mortgage and thus leave it open to the state
to assert its claim to unpaid taxes. In a word, it would have been
a decision which effectuated justice both to the state and the one
to whom the money, if the truth of the thing is allowed to be
shown, rightfully belongs.
-JAM.S

A. M WHORTER.

SPECIAL AsSESSMENTS-NECESSITY OF NOTICE TO MORTGGEES.-

A mortgage company, holding deeds of trust to real estate in the
municipality of Dunbar, sought to enforce the priority of their
lien against a subsequent paving assessment levied on the same
property by the city. In affirming the superiority of the assessment lien, the Supreme Court of Appeals decided that no notice
to the mortgagee was necessary. Mortgage Company of Maryland
v. Lory.'
As a general rule notice is necessary to bind the property owner
by special assessments,' However, cases have sustained the validity
of special assessments wherein no notice has been given.' In Davis
v. Lynchburg,"the Virginia court bound the property owner without notice of assessment, reasoning that proceedings of the work
itself was sufficient notice to the owner. In the absence of statute
requiring the same, other cases have held no notice of special
assessment is necessary.' A mortgagee, who has a contingent interest, at the most a defeasible security interest, would seem to present a weaker case for notice.
The rule seems to be well settled that notice by publication is
sufficient, if properly and reasonably given for the benefit of
property owners.
Also, if the property owner can contest the
'154 S. E. 136 (W. Va. 1930).
Whitlock v. Hawkins, 105 Va. 242, 53 S. E. 401 (1906); 4 DILLON, MuN.
CORP. (5th ed. 1911) § 1365; 5 McQUILLIN, MUN. CORP. (2nd ed. 1928) §
2226.
'Stevenson v. N. Y., 1 Hun 51 (N. Y. 1874).
'84 Va. 861, 6 S. E. 230 (1888).
5Collins v. Holyoke, 146 Mass. 29, 15 N. E. 908 (1888); Paulson v. Portland, 16 Ore. 450, 19 Pac. 450 (1888).
'Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 11 Sup. Ct. 825 (1890) ; Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U. S. 255, 23 Sup. Ct. 574 (1902) ; Citizens' Savings Bank v. Greenbaugh, 173 N. Y. 215, 65 N. E. 978 (1903).
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